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INTRODUCTION
Doris Oforji has a difficult choice. Awaiting deportation, she
must decide whether to leave her two daughters behind in the United
States or take them with her to Nigeria, where they will face female
genital mutilation (FGM).2 Should she desert her children, leaving
them half a world away under state supervision? Or should she risk
subjecting them to a painful, antiquated ritual, condemned by human
rights advocates around the world? Ms. Oforji appealed to the U.S.
t B.A., B.S. with Honors, University of Houston, 1995; M.S., University of Hous-
ton-Clear Lake, 2000; candidate forJ.D. with specialization in International Legal Affairs,
Cornell Law School, 2006; Managing Editor, Volume 91, Cornell Law Review. The author
would like to thank the many members of Cornell Law Review, Volumes 90-92, who gra-
ciously contributed to the editing of this piece-in particular, Christopher Soper, Matthew
Peller, and John Althouse Cohen. She would also like to express her deepest gratitude to
Kell Morris for his constant support and encouragement.
1 Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 617-18 (7th Cir. 2003).
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justice system to allow her to remain in the country with her U.S. citi-
zen daughters, but to no avail. A Seventh Circuit court told her that
the choice stands and is hers to make.2
Many parents face the same dilemma as Ms. Oforji-whether to
leave their children alone in the United States or risk their exposure
to FGM in the parents' home country-because our courts either re-
fuse to or cannot find legal authority to allow the parents to remain in
the United States. From 2002 to 2005, seven circuits decided fourteen
cases in which alien parents sought relief based on the fear that their
daughters would face FGM if the parents were deported.3 The court
addressed the merits of the claim in nine of these cases, relying on a
variety of legal theories and reaching divergent conclusions. 4 The de-
cisions have resulted in a circuit split on the issue of granting asylum
to these parents: Only the Sixth Circuit has granted asylum, whereas
the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have refused to grant
2 Id. at 618 ("Oforji will be faced with the unpleasant dilemma of permitting her
citizen children to remain in this country under the supervision of the state of Illinois...
or taking her children back to Nigeria to face the potential threat of FGM. Congress has
foreseen such difficult choices, but has opted to leave the choice with the illegal immi-
grant, not the courts.").
3 See Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Axmed v. U.S. Att'y
Gen., 145 F. App'x 669 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion); Jalloh v. Gonzales, 423
F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 2005); Kawu v. Ashcroft, 113 F. App'x 732 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(unpublished opinion); Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2004); Abay v. Ashcroft,
368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004); Swiri v. Ashcroft, 95 F. App'x 708 (5th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (unpublished decision); Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2004); Oforji,
354 F.3d 609; Obazee v. Ashcroft, 79 F. App'x 914 (7th Cir. 2003) (unpublished order);
Osigwe v. Ashcroft, 77 F. App'x 235 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (unpublished decision);
Alade v. Ashcroft, 69 F. App'x 771 (7th Cir. 2003) (unpublished order); Key v. INS, 64 F.
App'x 891 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (unpublished decision); Nwaokolo v. INS, 314
F.3d 303 (7th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). A fifteenth case was filed in district court, but was
dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction. SeeAyinde v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 358(GWG), 2003 WL
22087473 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2003).
4 In all of the cases except Abebe, Kawu, Swiri, Alade, and Key, the court at the very
least commented on the validity of a claim that the parents should be allowed to stay in the
United States based on the child's fear of FGM. See Abebe, 432 F.3d at 1043 (remanding to
the BIA to consider the probability that the daughter will face FGM, but not reaching the
question of whether the parents qualify for relief); Kawu, 113 F. App'x at 733 (denying
without comment parent's motion to supplement based on fear of child's FGM); Swiri, 95
F. App'x at 709 (denying motion to reopen in part because the fear of FGM claim was
available at the initial hearing); Alade, 69 F. App'x at 774-75 (denying asylum because
aliens failed to properly raise their FGM claim); Key, 64 F. App'x at 892-93 (denying mo-
tion to reopen because the FGM claim was available at the initial proceedings); cases cited
supra note 3. In Abebe, however, prior to rehearing, the Ninth Circuit had addressed the
parents' claim and denied it. Abebe v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated en
banc, 432 F.3d 1037.
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asylum.5 No circuit has allowed a parent to remain in the United
States under any other theory of relief.
6
The courts are not only condemning parents to a difficult deci-
sion, but also exposing young children to the possibility of an unnec-
essary medical procedure that is illegal in the United States. 7 FGM,
also known as female circumcision, is the ritual cutting of female geni-
talia practiced in many African and Asian countries, most often on
girls aged four to twelve.8 The mildest form, performed on a very
small percentage of girls subject to FGM, involves simply cutting the
hood of the clitoris. 9 More extreme forms entail complete removal of
the clitoris and labia followed by stitching together the two sides of
the vulva.10 FGM, usually performed without anesthesia, is extremely
painful, and can have serious, even fatal, consequences.1 1
Many women defend FGM as a traditional rite of passage and an
empowering female custom. The ritual, performed by another
woman, bonds women together and links them to their cultural
roles. 12 The accompanying ceremony is a joyous celebration, a time
of gift-giving and festivity.13 Some also claim that FGM is an Islamic
religious practice, although FGM predates Islam and is practiced by
non-Muslim groups. 14 Critics, on the other hand, condemn FGM as a
barbaric ritual that endangers women's health and perpetuates male
dominance. 15 FGM violates multiple human rights, including the
rights to life and physical integrity. 1 6 In addition, the UN considers
5 See Axmed, 145 F. App'x at 675-76;Jalloh, 423 F.3d at 899; Abebe, 379 F.3d at 759-60;
Olowo, 368 F.3d at 701; Abay, 368 F.3d at 642-43; Osigwe, 77 F. App'x at 235-36 (remanding
to the BIA to determine humanitarian asylum claim).
6 See cases cited supra note 3.
7 18 U.S.C. § 116 (2000).
8 See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 454
(2002). Two million girls experience FGM every year. See id. at 455. According to the U.S.
Department of State, FGM is so prevalent that in Nigeria 60% to 90% of women experi-
ence it "anytime from a few days after birth to a few days after death." OFFICE OF THE
SENIOR COORDINATOR FOR INT'L WOMEN'S ISSUES, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, NIGERIA: REPORT ON
FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION (FGM) OR FEMALE GENITAL CUTTING (FGC) (2001), available
at http://www.state.gov/g/wi/rls/rep/crfgm/10106.htm [hereinafter NIGERIA REPORT].
See generally FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION 3-9 (Anika Rahman & Nahid Toubia eds., 2000)
(describing the history, practice, and consequences of FGM around the world).
9 See INS RESOURCE INFORMATION CENTER, ALERT SERIES: WOMEN: FEMALE GENITAL
MUTILATION 2 (1994), available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/ric/docu-
mentation/alnga94-001%28fgm%29.pdf [hereinafter FGM ALERT].
10 See id. The victim's legs are bound from hip to ankle to keep her immobile during
the forty-day healing period. See NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 8.
11 See Nwaokolo v. INS, 314 F.3d 303, 308-09 (7th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); DUNOFF ET
AL., supra note 8, at 455; FGM ALERT, supra note 9, at 3.
12 See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 8, at 455.
13 See id.
14 See FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION, supra note 8, at 6; FGM ALERT, supra note 9, at 5.
15 See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 8, at 455.
16 See FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION, supra note 8, at 20-39.
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FGM violence against women and urges states to prevent and punish
the practice. 17
This Note discusses the possible grounds of relief for deportable
parents of children who face FGM. Part I provides a brief overview of
refugee law and procedure. Part II explains and evaluates the follow-
ing five theories on which the circuit courts have relied to grant or
deny relief: refugee status, humanitarian asylum, derivative asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Tor-
ture. Part III encourages reliance on a relatively new regulation for
grants of humanitarian asylum to some mothers whose children face
FGM and advocates two simple and legally well-supported statutory
changes that would allow more parents to remain in the United States
with their minor children. No parent should have to choose between
abandoning a child and placing her in danger of FGM.
I
OVERVIEW OF REFUGEE LAw
The international community developed asylum law to provide a
safe haven for persecuted individuals. In response to the many refu-
gees resulting from World War II, the UN adopted the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees.' The UN later strengthened the
Convention by eliminating its geographical and temporal limitations
in the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 19
In order to gain asylum in the United States, an alien must
demonstrate refugee status. 20 U.S. refugee law derives principally
from the Refugee Convention and the later Protocol, to which the
United States acceded in 1968.21 The Refugee Act of 1980, part of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), implemented the Protocol
and codified previously informal procedures to resettle refugees. 22
17 See G.A. Res. 58/156, 1 9-10, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/156
(Feb. 26, 2004); U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Violence Against Women in the Family,
20, 22-23, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68 (Mar. 10, 1999).
18 See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150
[hereinafter Refugee Convention]; David A. Martin, Large-Scale Migrations of Asylum Seekers,
76 AM. J. INT'L L. 598, 598 (1982). The United States did not join the Refugee Conven-
tion. See CHARLEs GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 33.01(1) (2003).
19 See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. I, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Refugee Protocol]; Tara Magner, A Less than "Pacific" Solu-
tion for Asylum Seekers in Australia, 16 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 53, 63 (2004).
20 See 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1) (A); see also infra Part II.A.
21 Refugee Protocol, supra note 19, 19 U.S.T. at 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. at 267; accord
GORDON ET AL., supra note 18, § 33.05(2); Anwen Hughes, Basics of U.S. Asylum Law, in
BAsic IMMIGRATION LAw 2004, at 313, 315 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook
Series No. F.139 (2004)).
22 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66
902 [Vol. 91:899
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Generally, an alien applies to the Attorney General for asylum
either by affirmative application through the U.S. Citizenship & Immi-
gration Services (USCIS) or by defensive application in response to
removal proceedings. 23 Applications for asylum automatically include
requests for withholding of removal if asylum is denied.24 Asylum of-
ficers interview affirmative applicants and make initial determinations
regarding refugee status, humanitarian asylum, and withholding of re-
moval. 25 Immigration judges (IJs) review denials of affirmative appli-
cations and make initial decisions on defensive applications. 26 The
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) then makes the final determina-
tion regarding asylum, which is subject to judicial review. 27
Applicants must meet strict substantive and procedural require-
ments to be considered for asylum. 28 The alien must be physically
present in the United States29 and must satisfy the following criteria:
(1) the alien cannot safely and legally relocate to another country, (2)
the alien has applied for asylum within one year of arrival in the
United States, and (3) the alien has not previously been denied asy-
lum. 30 The alien must then establish refugee status under the INA,
either directly3 or derivatively. 32 In rare cases, the alien may alterna-
tively qualify for a humanitarian grant of asylum. 33 But even if the
applicant otherwise qualifies, final discretion to grant or deny asylum
rests with the Attorney General, who considers such factors as the
alien's background and possible risks to national security. 34
Aliens who wish to remain in the United States because they fear
torture in their home countries have an alternate avenue of relief.
Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (2000)); GORDON ET AL.,
supra note 18, §§ 33.01(3), 33.05(2).
23 See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Dep't of Homeland Sec., Obtaining Asy-
lum in the United States: Two Paths to Asylum, http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asy-
lum/paths.htm (last modified Jan. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Paths to Asylum]. In 2004, the
Department of Homeland Security absorbed the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS), which was then renamed the USCIS. See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.,
Dep't of Homeland Sec., About Us, http://uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/index.htm (last
modified Jan. 20, 2006).
24 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (2004).
25 See Paths to Asylum, supra note 23; U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., Dep't of
Homeland Sec., What Is the Affirmative Asylum Process?, http://uscis.gov/graphics/ser-
vices/asylum/asylumprocess.htm (last modifiedJan. 21, 2006).
26 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 18, § 34.02(3) (e).
27 See id. § 3 4 .01(12)(g).
28 See id. § 33.05(1).
29 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2000).
30 See id. § 1158(a) (2).
31 See infra Part II.A.
32 See infra Part II.C.
33 See infra Part II.B.
34 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b); 8 C.F.R. § 208.14 (2004); GORDON ET AL., supra note 18,
§ 33.05(3) (b) (iii).
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The UN adopted the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) to prevent
and punish torture, which is defined as the infliction of
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental .... for such
purposes as obtaining from [a person] . . . information or a confes-
sion, punishing him .... or intimidating or coercing him .... or
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the con-
sent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity. 35
Article 3 of the CAT prohibits the return of a person to a state when
"there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in dan-
ger of being subjected to torture." 36 The United States became a
party to the CAT in 1994, but aliens could not obtain relief under the
CAT until Congress passed implementing legislation in 1998.3 7 Aliens
may now seek relief in the form of withholding of removal. 38
II
THEORIES OF RELIEF FOR PARENTS
WHOSE CHILDREN FACE FGM
Only one circuit court has allowed a parent to remain in the
United States because her daughter would face FGM if the parent
were deported.3 9 Although other theories of relief are arguably availa-
ble, all other circuits directly deciding the issue have denied relief.40
This result is puzzling given the value placed on family in the United
States and the emphasis on family unity in refugee law around the
world. The Supreme Court has long maintained "that the Constitu-
tion protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution
of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 41
The right to raise one's children is essential to liberty-a right "far
more precious ... than property rights."42 The integrity of the family
35 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment art. 1 (1), opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATy Doc. No. 100-20, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. For a detailed history, see Andrea Montavon-McKillip,
Note, CAT Among Pigeons: The Convention Against Torture, a Precarious Intersection Between In-
ternational Human Rights Law and U.S. Immigration Law, 44 ARz. L. REv. 247, 248-51 (2002).
36 CAT, supra note 35, art. 3.
37 See Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
§ 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-761, 2681-822; Dawn J. Miller, Holding States to Their Convention Obli-
gations: The United Nations Convention Against Torture and the Need for a Broad Interpretation of
State Action, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 299, 301 (2003).
38 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c) (2004).
39 Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004).
40 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
41 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion).
42 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953); accord Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923).
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unit is of cardinal importance. 43 Consequently, the "prime goal" of
U.S. immigration law is to keep families together.44 Because family
reunification is a dominant feature of the U.S. immigration system,
there are special preferences for family members of U.S. citizens. 45
Moreover, the principle of family unity was central to the very devel-
opment of international refugee law, from which U.S. immigration
law derived. 46 Although the principle was not formally included in
the 1951 Convention on refugee status, the majority of states observe
it.
7
Unfortunately, the "minimum requirement" of international ref-
ugee law "is the inclusion of the spouse and minor children," not of
the parents. 48 Other international law, however, expands the idea of
family unity by focusing beyond the head of the household. For ex-
ample, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the most widely
ratified human rights treaty in history, requires states to "ensure that a
child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will,
except when ... such separation is necessary for the best interests of
the child."49 Furthermore, the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) explicitly recognized that a mother could suc-
cessfully claim asylum if her daughters feared FGM. 50
Given the important role family unity plays in human values in
the United States and abroad, why is the United States forcing parents
to choose between leaving their children behind or taking them to a
foreign country where they could face FGM? Legally, the answer lies
in the fact that courts are having a difficult time finding statutory or
common law authority to help these parents. Courts have examined
at least five theories of relief, none of which adequately protects par-
ents and their children who face FGM.
43 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
44 148 CONG. REC. H4989, 4991 (daily ed. July 22, 2002) (statement of Rep. Sensen-
brenner); see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 147
(3d ed. 2002) ("[O]ne central value that United States immigration laws have long pro-
moted, albeit to varying degrees, is family unity.").
45 See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 302 (5th
ed. 2003).
46 See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 43 (1992).
47 See id.
48 Id.
49 Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 9, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1460.
The United States is one of only two countries that has not ratified this convention. See
Abebe v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 755, 764 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004) (FergusonJ., dissenting) (noting
that the other country that has not ratified the convention, Somalia, does not have a recog-
nized government), vacated en banc, 432 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2005).
50 See HEAVEN CRAwLEY, REFUGEES AND GENDER 181 (2001). The UNHCR opinion is
relevant here because U.S. refugee law derives from the 1951 UN Convention. See supra
note 21 and accompanying text.
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A. Refugee Status
In the landmark case of In re Kasinga, the BIA recognized FGM as
a legitimate ground for asylum.51 But only the Sixth Circuit has
granted asylum to a parent based on her fear that her daughter would
be subjected to FGM.5 2 Before a court can grant asylum, the alien
must demonstrate refugee status.53 The INA adopts the definition of
refugee found in the Refugee Convention: "any person . . . who is
unable or unwilling to return to . . . [that person's home] country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion."5 4 An applicant must therefore prove
four elements to be eligible for asylum: (1) inability or unwillingness
to return to one's home country due to (2) a well-founded fear of (3)
persecution (4) on account of an enumerated ground.55
The first element, inability or unwillingness to return to one's
home country, is generally subject to a finding of credible evidence. 56
The second element, a well-founded fear, has both subjective and ob-
jective components. 57 Credible testimony satisfies the subjective com-
ponent, whereas the objective component requires specific evidence
of a reasonable possibility of persecution, often met by State Depart-
ment country reports and asylum profiles. 58 The remaining two ele-
ments-persecution on account of an enumerated ground-present
significant difficulties for parents attempting to establish refugee sta-
tus based on their child's risk of FGM.
51 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996); see also Arthur C. Helton & Alison Nicoll,
Female Genital Mutilation as Ground for Asylum in the United States: The Recent Case of In re
Fauziya Kasinga and Prospects for More Gender Sensitive Approaches, 28 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L.
REv. 375, 375-76 (1997).
52 Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004).
53 See8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (1) (A) (2000).
54 Id. § 1101 (a)(42); Refugee Convention, supra note 18, art. I(A)(2). The Refugee
Act added the Convention's definition to the INA to bring the INA in conformance with
the Convention. See In reAcosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 219-20 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part
on other grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
55 In re Sanchez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 276, 283 (B.I.A. 1985).
56 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a), (b) (2) (i). For example, asylum has been denied when the
applicant has in fact returned to his home country after he initially left. See, e.g., Atoui v.
Ashcroft, 107 F. App'x 591, 593 (6th Cir. 2004).
57 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42); Nagoulkov. INS, 333 F.3d 1012,1016 (9th Cir. 2003); Inre
Sanchez, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 283.
58 See Ambartsoumian v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2004); Nagoulko, 333 F.3d
at 1016; Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 341 (9th Cir. 1994). The Seventh Circuit has harshly
criticized overreliance on these reports and profiles because the State Department is often
biased, and because asylum applicants cannot adequately challenge the conclusions. See
Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687, 700 (7th Cir. 2004); Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652,
658-59 (7th Cir. 2004).
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1. Persecution
Although the term "persecution" is not statutorily defined, the
BIA has construed it as "harm or suffering... inflicted upon an indi-
vidual in order to punish him for possessing a belief or characteristic a
persecutor [seeks] to overcome . . .[and] inflicted either by the gov-
ernment of a country or by persons or an organization that the gov-
ernment [is] unable or unwilling to control. '5 9  In particular,
persecution comprises torture, confinement, and severe economic
deprivation that constitutes a threat to life or freedom. 60 Persecution
also includes harm inflicted for "political, religious, or other reasons
that this country does not recognize as legitimate."6' The Third Cir-
cuit warns, however, "that 'persecution' is an extreme concept that
does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offen-
sive."'6 2 An asylum applicant "need not prove that it is more likely
than not that he or she will be persecuted in his or her home coun-
try. "63 Although there must be a "real chance" that persecution will
occur, even a ten percent chance of actual persecution may be
sufficient. 64
While the Refugee Act generally contemplated persecution at the
hands of the government, courts have expanded the concept to in-
clude harm inflicted by individuals or organizations that a govern-
ment cannot or will not control.65 Hence, mob action that the
government cannot restrain may be grounds for asylum,6 6 but spousal
abuse is not-unless the wife can show that she has sought govern-
mental protection or that the government is unwilling to protect
her.67 Thus, there must be some nexus between the harm and the
government. 68
FGM itself constitutes persecution, as a brutal mutilation from
which most women can expect little state protection. 69 Parents, how-
59 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222 (citations omitted).
60 See id. But general travel restrictions in the home country or harsh conditions do
not amount to persecution. See id.
61 De Souza v. INS, 999 F.2d 1156, 1158 (7th Cir. 1993).
62 Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993).
63 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987). Prior to 1987, the INS applied a
"clear probability" standard, under which an applicant had to provide objective evidence
that the alien would "more likely than not" be subjected to persecution. See INS v. Stevic,
467 U.S. 407, 413, 429-30 (1984).
64 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440 & n.24; Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 990
(9th Cir. 2000).
65 See In re McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec. 542, 544-45 (B.I.A. 1980).
66 See Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971).
67 See Rusovan v. INS, 139 F.3d 902, 1998 WL 78999, at *2 (7th Cir. 1998) (unpub-
lished table decision).
68 See id. at *1.
69 See Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 795-96, 798 (9th Cir. 2005); In re Kas-
inga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 365, 367 (B.I.A. 1996).
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ever, do not fear the infliction of FGM on themselves, but instead fear
its infliction on their daughters. Thus, the problem with granting asy-
lum to a parent based on a daughter's risk of FGM is that the parent is
not the one personally subject to the persecution of FGM. Accord-
ingly, the Seventh Circuit has refused to grant refugee status to par-
ents based on the fear that their daughters will face FGM, maintaining
that the standards for refugee status "require an applicant to demon-
strate that she herself will be subject to persecution if removed, and
do not encompass any consideration of persecution that may be suf-
fered by others-even family members-who may be obliged to re-
turn with her" to her home country.70 When Esther Olowo, a
Nigerian citizen, applied for asylum on the ground that her twin
daughters would be subjected to FGM if she were deported, the court
found that "Ms. Olowo did not demonstrate that, if removed to Nige-
ria, she herself would face persecution on account of her membership
in a social group. '71 The court not only denied Ms. Olowo refugee
status, but also went so far as suggesting that the state remove her U.S.
citizen daughters from her custody because she intended to take them
with her to Nigeria, where they would be forced to undergo FGM.72
The Sixth Circuit, however, reached a different conclusion in a
case with similar facts. Yayeshwork Abay and her nine-year-old daugh-
ter, Burhan Amare, both citizens of Ethiopia, sought asylum based on
the fear that Amare would be forced to undergo FGM in Ethiopia if
deported. 73 The Sixth Circuit granted Amare asylum based on her
own fear of FGM and then turned to the question of whether her
mother was also eligible for asylum.74 In support of Abay's claim, the
court noted that the BIA had previously granted asylum to an alien
based on harm to a family member: An alien whose wife was forcibly
sterilized in China was considered a refugee under the INA.75 In addi-
tion, the court observed that the USCIS had previously withheld re-
moval of parents whose daughters would face FGM upon the parents'
70 Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 701 (7th Cir. 2004); accord Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354
F.3d 609, 617 (7th Cir. 2003); Obazee v. Ashcroft, 79 F. App'x 914, 917 (7th Cir. 2003)
(unpublished order).
71 Olowo, 368 F.3d at 701.
72 See id. at 702-03.
73 See Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 635-36 (6th Cir. 2004).
74 See id. at 640-41.
75 See id. at 641 (citing In re C-Y-Z-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 915, 918-919 (B.I.A. 1997)).
[Vol. 91:899
A PARENT'S PREDICAMENT
deportation 76 and that the BIA had reopened a case to allow a mother
to argue that her child would face FGM if she were deported.77
The Abay court found in this precedent "a governing principle in
favor of refugee status in cases where a parent and protector is faced
with exposing her child to the clear risk of being subjected against her
will to a practice that is a form of physical torture causing grave and
permanent harm."78 The mother's suffering as a consequence of be-
ing forced to allow the mutilation of her daughter in itself amounts to
persecution: "[A] rational factfinder would be compelled to find that
Abay's fear of taking her daughter into the lion's den of female geni-
tal mutilation in Ethiopia and being forced to witness the pain and
suffering of her daughter is well-founded." 79 Thus, the court granted
Abay herself refugee status. 80
Although the Sixth Circuit's reasoning may be more appealing,
the Seventh Circuit's view is legally sound.81 Clearly, a parent who
must witness her child's physical pain suffers herself. The question in
asylum cases, however, is whether that suffering rises to the level of
persecution. Under the established legal standard, not every unpleas-
ant act-and "unpleasant" in this case is admittedly an understate-
ment-qualifies as persecution. A child's pain is something that no
parent wants to witness, but the act of witnessing that pain does not
constitute a threat to the parent's life or freedom. 82 Our society may
find FGM barbaric and offensive, but the parent's suffering in re-
sponse to the child's FGM may not be so extreme as to reach the level
of persecution.
2. On Account of Membership in a Particular Social Group
Even if a court accepts that the parent's suffering amounts to per-
secution, the parent must also prove that the suffering is inflicted "on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular so-
cial group, or political opinion."8 3 Of these, "membership in a partic-
ular social group" has been the most difficult category to define, and
76 See Abay, 368 F.3d at 641-42 (citing In reAdeniji, No. A41 542 131 (oral decision)
(U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Immigration Court, York, Pa., Mar. 10, 1998); In re Oluloro, No. A72
147 491 (oral decision) (U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Immigration Court, Seattle, Wash., Mar. 23,
1994)). But see infra Part II.A.3.
77 See id. at 642 (citing In re Dibba, No. A73 541 857 (B.I.A. Nov. 23, 2001)). But see
infra text accompanying note 104.
78 Abay, 368 F.3d at 642.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 But see Marcelle Rice, Protecting Parents: Why Mothers and Fathers Who Oppose Female
Genital Cutting Qualify for Asylum, IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS, Nov. 2004, at 1-5, 8-9.
82 See Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 701 (7th Cir. 2004).
83 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000).
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thus the easiest to manipulate.8 4 The BIA, to which courts generally
defer, interprets "social group" as "a group of persons all of whom
share a common, immutable characteristic."8 5 This characteristic may
be innate, such as gender or kinship ties, or it may be some shared
past experience, depending on the circumstances of the particular
case.86 Regardless, it "must be one that the members of the group
either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it
is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences. '" 8 7
A social group may be as small as one family, or it may be as large
as the groups mentioned in the other four grounds, such as an entire
race or nationality.88 Nevertheless, "[p] ossession of broadly-based
characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow indi-
viduals with membership in a particular group. '89 Gender is often a
defining characteristic of a social group, but no court has granted asy-
lum based solely on gender persecution. 90
In FGM cases, courts define the social group very narrowly. For
example, in In re Kasinga, the BIA defined Kasinga's social group as
"young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had
FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice." 91 The
BIA then remarked:
84 See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1238-39 (3d Cir. 1993).
85 In reAcosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part on other grounds
by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); see also Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1239 (noting
that the BIA's interpretation is entitled to deference and citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
86 See Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1239-40.
87 Id. at 1240.
88 SeeAguirre-Cervantes v. INS, 242 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir.), vacated, 270 F.3d 794
(9th Cir. 2001); Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993). Family membership
in a clan is also a legitimate social group. See In re H-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 337, 343 (B.I.A.
1996).
89 Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991); accord Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d
1463, 1467 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that being "'young urban male' is not specific enough
to constitute membership in a particular social group"). But see Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240
("[T]o the extent that the petitioner in this case suggests that she would be persecuted...
in Iran simply because she is a woman, she has satisfied [membership in a particular social
group].").
90 See, e.g., Seifu v. Ashcroft, 80 F. App'x 323, 323-24 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)
(unpublished decision); Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240; see also Memorandum from Phyllis Coven,
Office of Int'l Affairs, Dep't of Justice, to All INS Asylum Office/rs [sic], HQASM Coor-
dinators (May 26, 1995) (also known as INS Gender Guidelines), available at http://www.
asylumlaw.org/docs/showDocument.cfm?documentlD=454 (last visited Mar. 25, 2006)
("[W] hile some courts have concluded as a legal matter that gender can define a particular
social group, no court has concluded as a factual matter that an applicant has demon-
strated that the government... would seek to harm her solely on account of gender."). See
generally Stephen M. Knight, Seeking Asylum from Gender Persecution: Progress amid Uncertainty,
79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 689 (2002) (discussing the status of gender-based asylum claims).
91 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996).
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[T] he particular social group is defined by common characteristics
that members of the group either cannot change, or should not be
required to change because such characteristics are fundamental to
their individual identities. The characteristics of being a "young
woman" and a "member of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe" cannot
be changed. The characteristic of having intact genitalia is one that
is so fundamental to the individual identity of a young woman that
she should not be required to change it.9 2
Furthermore, and critical to the establishment of refugee status, the
BIA concluded that the persecution occurs because of the victim's
membership in this social group, relying heavily on the fact that there
is no other, legitimate reason for FGM. 93
When a child faces FGM, her parents are arguably members of a
social group encompassing parents of "young women of [Tribe A]
who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose
the practice. '9 4 Nevertheless, the suffering, or "persecution," neces-
sary for refugee status is not intentionally inflicted on the parents "on
account of' their membership in this group. Rather, the harm is in-
flicted upon the child because of the child's membership in a particu-
lar social group. The Sixth Circuit did not address this problem when
it granted asylum to Abay.
3. Abay v. Ashcroft: Inapplicable Reasoning
In Abay, the Sixth Circuit did not explain how a parent's persecu-
tion resulting from her child's FGM is on account of an enumerated
ground. The decision is further flawed because the court relied on
support not directly applicable to the issue at hand. First, the court
suggested that a finding of persecution based on harm to a family
member is not unusual, relying primarily on In re C-Y-Z-, in which a
man was granted asylum based on the forced sterilization of his wife
under Chinese coercive population control measures.9 5 The U.S. po-
sition in population control cases is that the husband himself has un-
dergone past persecution: "'The husband of a sterilized wife can
essentially stand in her shoes and make a bona fide and non-frivolous
application for asylum based on problems impacting more intimately
on her than on him."' 9 6 The sterilization in essence affects both the
husband and the wife equally, since the two can no longer have chil-
dren together. In the case of a parent whose child faces FGM, how-
ever, the impact on the parent is not equivalent to the impact on the
92 Id. at 366.
93 See id. at 366-67.
94 Id. at 365.
95 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
96 In re C-Y-Z-, 211. & N. Dec. 915, 918 (B.I.A. 1997) (quoting the INS brief on appeal
in the case).
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child, and therefore the situation is not analogous to that of coercive
population control. Furthermore, coercive population control has a
special significance in U.S. asylum law that FGM does not: In 1996, as
a show of opposition to China's population control measures, Con-
gress specifically amended the INA definition of refugee to address
coercive population control. 97
Second, the Abay court noted that the USCIS has granted relief to
parents of children facing FGM under the "more stringent" standard
for withholding of removal.98 The cases cited by the court, however,
fell under the exceptional hardship provision of the INA99-a very
different avenue of relief than asylum. The provision grants withhold-
ing of removal to qualifying aliens whose deportation would prove an
"exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to a U.S. citizen or per-
manent resident spouse, parent, or child.100 The focus of the court's
inquiry in exceptional hardship cases is whether the child will experi-
ence exceptional hardship upon a parent's deportation, whereas in
asylum cases, the focus is the persecution of the alien parent. Thus,
the exceptional hardship cases cited are not precedent for cases on
refugee status; a parent may easily qualify for relief under the excep-
tional hardship provision but still fail to satisfy the less stringent-but
very different-standard for asylum.
Finally, the court cited In re Dibba, in which the BIA reopened an
asylum case based on a mother's fear that her daughter would be sub-
ject to FGM in the mother's home country.10' In that case, the BIA
found merely that the mother had presented sufficient evidence to
reopen the case, expressly stating that the alien had not fully demon-
strated refugee status.10 2 The standard for reopening an asylum case
is much less stringent than for granting asylum. 10 3 Although the BIA
appeared receptive to granting asylum to the mother in In re Dibba, it
has not affirmatively established a principle in favor of refugee status
for parents in this situation. 10 4
In summary, although granting refugee status to parents of chil-
dren who face FGM is appealing, the legal standard is simply not met,
97 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 601(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-689 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42)
(2000)); In re X-P-T-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 634, 635-36 (B.I.A. 1996). See generally Kimberly
Sicard, Note, Section 601 of IIRIRA: A Long Road to a Resolution of United States Asylum Policy
Regarding Coercive Methods of Population Contro 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 927, 932-36 (2000)
(describing the events leading to the amendment of the definition of refugee).
98 See supra note 76.
99 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (1) (D) (2000).
1oo See infra Part II.D.
101 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
102 See In re Dibba, No. A73 541 857 (B.I.A. Nov. 23, 2001).
103 See Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir. 2004).
104 See, e.g., Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 698 (7th Cir. 2004).
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primarily because parents do not suffer persecution on account of
their own membership in a particular social group or other enumer-
ated category. Nevertheless, there are other ways to keep families to-
gether without changing-or distorting-the legal standard for
refugee status.
B. Humanitarian Grants of Asylum
An alien who fails to establish a well-founded fear of persecution
may nonetheless receive asylum by demonstrating "compelling rea-
sons for being unwilling or unable to return to the [home] country
arising out of the severity of the past persecution. '" 10 5 The principle
derives from the Refugee Protocol, which states: "It is frequently rec-
ognized that a person who-or whose family-has suffered under
atrocious forms of persecution should not be expected to repatri-
ate. °106 This "humanitarian" grant of asylum is thus available when
there is no danger of future persecution but the applicant establishes
past persecution "so severe that repatriation would be inhumane. 10 7
Humanitarian grants of asylum are rare, reserved for victims of
particularly heinous abuse. 08 The paradigmatic case involved a Chi-
nese man who suffered years of horrific physical and psychological
abuse during the Cultural Revolution. 10 9 Applicants who suffer any-
thing less are unlikely to receive humanitarian grants of asylum.110
In 2001, however, Congress made a humanitarian grant of asylum
available to an alien who establishes both past persecution in his or
her home country and "a reasonable possibility that he or she may
suffer other serious harm upon removal to that country."11' "Other
serious harm" is defined as "harm that is not inflicted on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion, but is so serious that it equals the severity of persecu-
tion."'112 No court has yet utilized this new regulation to grant asy-
lum. 113 A recent Fifth Circuit case suggests, however, that some
105 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A) (2004); accord Krastev v. INS, 292 F.3d 1268, 1271
(10th Cir. 2002).
106 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCE-
DURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENrION AND
THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 136 (1979); accord In re Chen,
20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 19 (B.I.A. 1989).
107 Baka v. INS, 963 F.2d 1376, 1379 (10th Cir. 1992).
108 See Bucur v. INS, 109 F.3d 399, 404-05 (7th Cir. 1997).
109 See In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 19-21.
110 See Mullai v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 635, 637 (6th Cir. 2004).
11 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (iii)(B) (2004); accord Belishta v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1078,
1080 (9th Cir. 2004); Krastev v. INS, 292 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 2002).
112 Asylum Procedures, 65 Fed. Reg. 76121, 76127 (Dec. 6, 2000).
113 Two recent cases have been remanded to consider the "other serious harm" prong
of the regulation. See Arboleda v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 434 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2006)
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mothers whose children face FGM may be eligible for humanitarian
grants of asylum. Ngozi Victoria Osigwe and her husband sought asy-
lum on the ground that their daughter risks FGM if the family is
forced to return to Nigeria.1 4 On review, the Fifth Circuit remanded
the case to the BIA to decide whether these circumstances warrant a
discretionary grant of humanitarian asylum.' 1 5
Under the traditional standard for humanitarian asylum, it is un-
likely that the Osigwes would receive asylum. The BIA would assess
the severity of Ms. Osigwe's past persecution and compare it with the
harm suffered by the victims of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and
the Cambodian genocide. 1 6 Some women might be able to meet this
standard given the severity of some forms of FGM,117 but for many
women, the ritual would not reach the required severity.
The 2001 amendment, however, may provide another avenue to
humanitarian grants of asylum for mothers who have undergone FGM
and whose children will face FGM if returned to the home country.
Under the new regulation, the severity of the past abuse is not the
dominant factor. A mother will be eligible for a humanitarian grant
of asylum if she can prove (1) past persecution and (2) the possibility
that she will suffer other serious harm if deported. 118 FGM qualifies
as persecution. 119 Thus, if the mother previously suffered FGM, she
can likely establish the first element of the claim. The second ele-
ment, other serious harm, is harm that rises to the level of persecution
yet is not inflicted on an enumerated ground under the asylum provi-
sion. 120 As discussed above, the primary problem with a mother's es-
tablishing her own refugee status on the basis of her child's risk of
FGM is that the mother's suffering-the consequence of witnessing
her daughter's torture-is not inflicted on account of the mother's
membership in a particular social group. Accordingly, the mother's
suffering seems to be the perfect case of other serious harm-harm
that does not qualify the alien for refugee status because it is not in-
flicted on account of an enumerated ground, but is serious enough to
make it inhumane to send her back to her home country. The only
question is whether other courts will join the Sixth Circuit in holding
that the mother's suffering rises to the level of persecution.12 1
(per curiam); Shala v. Gonzales, No. 04-1039-AG NAC, 2006 WL 93002, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan.
9, 2006) (unpublished order).
114 See Osigwe v. Ashcroft, 77 F. App'x 235, 235 (5th Cir. 2003) (unpublished
decision).
115 See id. at 235-36.
116 See Bucur v. INS, 109 F.3d 399, 405 (7th Cir. 1997).
117 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
118 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
119 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
120 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
121 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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The humanitarian grant of asylum under the 2001 amendment is
a promising possibility for those mothers who underwent FGM in
their home countries. It would not, however, help mothers who man-
aged to escape FGM, or fathers who cannot append their own asylum
claims to the mothers' claims. Therefore, the provision would be of
limited use in many cases.
C. Derivative Asylum: Spouses and Children
An alien's spouse or child who does not otherwise qualify for asy-
lum may "be granted the same status as the alien if accompanying, or
following to join, such alien,"122 subject to similar discretionary stan-
dards.12 3 Although derivative asylum has received little academic at-
tention, one can understand the principal reason for granting asylum
to spouses and children of asylees: keeping families together. 124
Strangely, however, there is no general statutory authority for grant-
ing derivative asylum to a parent on the basis of a child's asylee sta-
tus.1 25 This fact leads to an absurd result. If a woman receives asylum
for fear of FGM, then her husband and children will receive derivative
asylum. But if a minor child receives asylum for fear of FGM, her
parents will not receive derivative asylum; the child must remain in
the United States alone. It is difficult to explain Congress's failing to
grant derivative asylum to a minor child's parent, while specifically
protecting an adult's spouse and children. 126
Thus, even if an alien child receives asylum based on her fear of
FGM, her parents may still face deportation. The parents will then
face the choice of deserting their daughter in the United States or
taking her with them to their home country to risk FGM. Manyjudges
probably agree with Judge Ferguson of the Ninth Circuit:
I do not believe that Congress intended any parent to face that
choice. If Congress failed to clarify, in so many words, that a parent
122 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3) (A) (2000); accord GORDON ET AL., supra note 18, § 33.05(5).
Some courts have added confusion to this area by using the term "derivative asylum" inter-
changeably with "constructive deportation," discussed later, or to mean the establishment
of refugee status in the parent's own right on the grounds of harm to the child, as in Abay,
discussed previously. See, e.g., Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 701 (7th Cir. 2004)
("[Claims for 'derivative asylum' based on potential harm to an applicant's children are
cognizable only when the applicant's children are subject to 'constructive deporta-
tion' .... ); Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 2003). Such usage is inappro-
priate, however, given the specific statutory meaning of derivative asylum. See 8 C.F.R.
208.21 (a) (2004).
123 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.21(a). There is no appeal from discretionary denial. Id.
§ 208.21 (e).
124 See supra notes 41-47 (discussing family unity as a primary goal of immigration
law).
125 See Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 641 (6th Cir. 2004).
126 See Abebe v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 755, 763-64 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ferguson, J., dissent-
ing), vacated en banc, 432 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2005).
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may claim asylum on the basis of a threat to her child, that omission
is attributable only to a failure to imagine that so many young chil-
dren would be independently targeted for persecution .... Surely,
Congress did not intend parents to choose between exposing their
children to such threats and abandoning them halfway around the
world.1 2 7
Unfortunately, in this case,judges are bound by the text of the statute,
and derivative asylum provides no relief for parents of children who
face FGM.
D. Withholding of Removal: Exceptional Hardship and
Constructive Deportation
An alien who does not qualify for asylum may still qualify for with-
holding of removal under the exceptional hardship provision of the
INA if "removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence."1 28 For a child whose parents are being deported, the pros-
pect of facing FGM in a foreign country is undoubtedly an
exceptional hardship. Likewise, if a child remains alone in the United
States, her separation from her parents is an equal hardship. 129
Therefore, parents of American citizens or permanent resident aliens
who would face FGM if they accompanied their parents into exile may
receive withholding of removal, but only if the parent has lived in the
United States for at least ten years and meets the provision's other
stringent requirements. 130
A significant problem arises, however, if only the primary
caregiver is deported, but the other parent has the right to remain in
the United States. In that case, a court may find that there is no hard-
ship to the child-even if the child has had no contact with the re-
maining parent-because the child can stay in the country with that
parent.13' To receive withholding of removal, the departing parent
would then have to convince a court that handing the child over to
the remaining parent would constitute a hardship to the child.
127 Id. at 763.
128 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2000).
129 See Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 617 (7th Cir. 2003).
130 See 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1) ("The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and ad-
just to the status of an alien . . . if the alien . . . (A) has been physically present in the
United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the
date of such application; (B) has been a person of good moral character during such
period; (C) has not been convicted of an offense ... ; and (D) establishes that removal
would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, parent,
or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence.").
131 See Obazee v. Ashcroft, 79 F. App'x 914, 917 (7th Cir. 2003) (unpublished order).
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In Salameda v. INS, the Seventh Circuit extended the exceptional
hardship provision through the constructive deportation doctrine. 3 2
In 1991, the Salamedas applied for suspension of deportation under
the predecessor to the current exceptional hardship provision of the
INA, which required a seven- rather than ten-year residency in the
United States, claiming that their deportation would be a hardship to
their son.133 The child, however, was neither a U.S. citizen nor a per-
manent resident, and therefore the provision did not apply.134 The
court nevertheless concluded that the parents' deportation would re-
sult in the son's constructive deportation, as he had no legal right of
his own to remain in the country, and therefore that the son's hard-
ship should be considered in the parents' application for withholding
of deportation. 135
Unfortunately for most parents, the constructive deportation doc-
trine has since been limited to the narrow ambit of the case that cre-
ated it: The doctrine applies only to alien children when both parents
face deportation. 136 The Seventh Circuit once suggested that the con-
structive deportation doctrine might allow consideration of a child's
hardship in determining whether to grant asylum or CAT relief to de-
portable parents.13 7 In Nwaokolo v. INS, the court granted a stay of
deportation and remanded a petition to reopen a deportation case
because the BIA denied the petition without considering the hardship
to the applicant's four-year-old American citizen daughter, who would
face FGM if she accompanied her mother to Nigeria.138 This exten-
sion of the constructive deportation doctrine would have greatly aided
parents whose children faced FGM upon the parents' deportation; the
parents could receive direct relief based on the child's fear of FGM. 13 9
The Seventh Circuit, however, later halted this line of reasoning in
Oforji v. Ashcroft " [W] e now hold that an alien parent who has no legal
standing to remain in the United States may not establish a derivative
132 70 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1995).
133 Id. at 448 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1) (1994) (repealed 1996)).
134 See id. at 449, 451.
135 See id. at 451; accord Ofoiji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2003) (sum-
marizing Salameda).
136 See Ofori, 354 F.3d at 616.
137 See Olowo, 368 F.3d at 701; Ofoti, 354 F.3d at 614-16; Obazee v. Ashcroft, 79 F.
App'x 914, 917 (7th Cir. 2003) (unpublished order); Nwaokolo v. INS, 314 F.3d 303,
307-08 (7th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); see also supra Part II.A (discussing asylum); infra Part
II.E (discussing relief under the CAT).
138 314 F.3d at 307-08.
139 Cf supra Part II.A (describing the refusal of most courts to grant asylum based on
the persecution of a family member).
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claim for asylum by pointing to potential hardship to the alien's
United States citizen child in the event of the alien's deportation."1 40
The constructive deportation doctrine thus offers very narrow
protection to parents of alien children, applying only if the alien child
does not have the option to stay in the United States. But because an
alien child facing FGM if her parents are deported would most likely
qualify for asylum herself, it would be a rare case in which the con-
structive deportation doctrine would save a parent from the predica-
ment of deserting the child or exposing her to the risk of FGM.
E. Relief Under the CAT
Although the CAT offers an alternative for aliens whose claims
fall outside the traditional framework of asylum, 141 the standard for
relief is somewhat narrower. 142 The applicant must prove that she will
more likely than not suffer torture in her home country, as opposed
to the more lenient burden of showing a "real chance" of persecution
for asylum. 143 Evidence of past torture is relevant but not sufficient;
the applicant must show a probability of future torture. 144 Further-
more, to meet this burden, the harm must be inflicted with the con-
sent or acquiescence of a public official, meaning that the official
must be aware of the activity before it occurs.' 45 Actual knowledge is
not required; willful blindness suffices to meet the burden. 146 How-
ever, if a government is powerless to stop the activity, the alien is not
protected under the CAT as he would be under refugee law.147
In addition, unlike the regulations governing asylum based on
refugee status, those regulating relief under the CAT do not expressly
140 354 F.3d at 618. Again, the Seventh Circuit has borrowed the term "derivative asy-
lum" to describe its consideration of hardship to a third party, the child. See id. at 614;
supra note 122.
141 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
142 There is no discretion to refuse removal because of the alien's background or po-
tential threat, as there is in grants of asylum based on refugee status. See In re H-M-V-, 22 I.
& N. Dec. 256, 269 (B.I.A. 1998) (Rosenberg, Board Member, dissenting); Regulations
Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478, 8480-81 (Feb. 19, 1999).
This prohibition on "refoulement" was a significant obstacle to the ratification of the treaty
in the United States, see Miller, supra note 37, at 301, and met further resistance from the
INS, see Montavon-McKillip, supra note 35, at 251. But under existing legislation, an alien
who does not qualify for withholding of removal will obtain deferral of removal. See 8
C.F.R. § 208.16(c) (4) (2004).
143 See Ambartsoumian v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 88-89 (3d Cir. 2004); 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.16(c) (2); supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
144 See Hamoui v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 2004).
145 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a) (1), (7).
146 See In re S-V-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 1306, 1311-12 (B.I.A. 2000).
147 Compare id. at 1312 ("[A] government's inability to control a group ought not lead
to the conclusion that the government acquiesced to the group's activities."), with supra
notes 65-66 and accompanying text (noting that under asylum law, persecution includes
harm inflicted by groups that governments cannot control).
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include a derivative asylum provision.1 48 Whether derivative relief is
available under the CAT is an open question; the Ninth Circuit re-
cently remanded a case so that the BIA could "bring its considerable
experience and expertise to bear on the issue.' 49 The Seventh Cir-
cuit, however, denied the availability of derivative relief, relying on the
express wording of the CAT itself: The applicant must "'establish that
it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to
the proposed country of removal."150
In two separate cases, parents with children facing FGM in their
home countries have sought CAT relief in the Seventh Circuit. The
court first granted one mother a stay of deportation pending review of
her petition to reopen deportation hearings, suggesting that the BIA
should consider the threat to the daughter created by the mother's
deportation. 5 1 The following year, however, the court foreclosed any
claim of "derivative asylum" under the CAT based on the torture of
any person other than the alien requesting relief.152 The regulations
specifically require that "'the alien is more likely than not to be tor-
tured in the country of removal.'1 53
The logic underlying that view is very similar to that of denying
refugee status to these parents: It is not the parents themselves who
face persecution or torture. As with refugee status, however, the par-
ents have some argument that they experience severe mental anguish
that rises to the level of torture when they must watch their daughters
undergo FGM. Furthermore, as required by the definition of torture,
the reason for the parents' suffering is arguably based on discrimina-
tion. 154 Many critics claim that FGM is a discriminatory practice, so-
cially subjugating women and girls to male dominance. 1 55 But no
court has granted CAT relief to a parent whose daughter risks FGM if
the parent is deported.
One problem these parents face is that the standard for relief
under the CAT is generally narrower than that for asylum, requiring a
showing of a higher probability of harm upon deportation. 156 Per-
haps applicants generally assume that if they cannot qualify for asy-
148 See Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2004); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c).
149 Azanor, 364 F.3d at 1021.
150 Ofoji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 615 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.16(c) (2)).
151 See Nwaokolo v. INS, 314 F.3d 303, 308 (7th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); see also supra
notes 137-40 and accompanying text (describing the Seventh Circuit's discussion, and ulti-
mate dismissal, of the theory that the constructive deportation doctrine allows considera-
tion of the hardship to a child in the parent's deportation hearing).
152 See Oforji, 354 F.3d at 615-18.
153 Id. at 615 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4)).
154 See CAT, supra note 35, art. 1 (1).
155 See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 8, at 455.
156 See Ambartsoumian v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 88-89 (3d Cir. 2004).
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lum, they probably will not qualify under the more stringent standard
for CAT relief. Or perhaps applicants do not believe they can ade-
quately prove that their suffering is "torture" or that the torture is
based on discrimination. Furthermore, a court might require a show-
ing that the parents, rather than the children, suffer the required dis-
crimination, and find that there is no direct discrimination against the
parent.
A further problem is that the parent must also prove that his suf-
fering is inflicted by the government or with its consent. 157 Many
countries where FGM is prevalent are working to eradicate the prac-
tice-at least formally. 158 Parents from these countries may thus find
it difficult to show that the government acquiesces in the practice. 159
Given the few forms of relief available, the argument that a par-
ent merits relief under the CAT when a child faces FGM upon the
parent's removal is plausible and could succeed if properly stated
before a sympathetic court.160 As previously discussed, the Ninth Cir-
cuit recently remanded a case to the BIA to determine in the first
instance whether a mother could establish a claim under the CAT
based on the fact that her daughter would be subject to FGM if the
mother were deported. 161 Although the reviewing court refused to
speculate on the likelihood of the alien's success, the remand implies
that the court is open to the claim. 162
III
PREVENTING A PARENT'S PREDICAMENT:
THE CASE FOR CHANGE
Regardless of individual views on whether FGM is a form of tor-
ture or a celebrated rite of passage, FGM is a crime in the United
States,'63 and many women and girls come to this country to escape
the violent practice. Even a cultural relativist would be hard-pressed
to agree that a girl who does not wish to undergo FGM should be
157 See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text; see also Lori A. Nessel, "Willful Blind-
ness" to Gender-Based Violence Abroad: United States' Implementation of Article Three of the United
Nations Convention Against Torture, 89 MINN. L. REv. 71, 119-23 (2004) (describing various
interpretations of government "acquiescence" required to grant CAT relief).
158 See FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION, supra note 8, at 101.
159 See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
160 Compare Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 615-18 (7th Cir. 2003) (granting a stay of
deportation in essence to consider granting CAT relief), with Nwaokolo v. INS, 314 F.3d
303, 307-08 (7th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (denying derivative CAT relief). In both cases,
the applicants applied for relief based on their children's suffering-not their own.
161 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
162 The BIA, however, cited Ofoji when it denied relief the first time, suggesting that
its position is similar to that of the Seventh Circuit, which foreclosed derivative claims
under the CAT. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
163 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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subjected to the painful and debilitating procedure against her will.
Indeed, FGM is a ground for asylum for those who face it in their
home countries. 164
But the situation is different for a parent whose daughter faces
FGM if she accompanies the parent upon removal from the United
States. Although the daughter may be able to remain in the United
States through asylum or based on her own citizenship, the parent has
very limited options under current law. The parent then faces a diffi-
cult decision: whether to abandon the child in the United States,
often in the custody of strangers, or to take the child to a foreign
country where she faces FGM. Given the value placed on family unity
both in American society in general and in immigration law in partic-
ular,1 65 a parent should not have to face this choice. Rather, the par-
ent deserves some form of legal relief.
Under current law, parents can request asylum or relief under
the CAT, although significant problems arise from certain elements of
both claims. Ultimately, there is only a slim chance that the parent
will qualify for relief, and even then, most courts would agree that the
claims stretch the boundaries of the law. Similarly, parents of Ameri-
can citizens and permanent resident aliens may qualify for withhold-
ing of removal under the exceptional hardship provision of the INA,
but only if, inter alia, they have already resided in the United States
for ten years. Given that there is always the possibility of turning cus-
tody of the child over to the state, insensitive courts can bypass this
provision even for the few parents who might otherwise qualify for
relief.
Thus, the humanitarian grant of asylum is the only promising ave-
nue of relief under current law-and it is only available to mothers
who have undergone FGM themselves.' 66 Since the mother can estab-
lish past persecution, she need only show other serious harm if she is
deported-that is, harm that rises to the level of persecution but is not
inflicted on account of, inter alia, membership in a particular social
group, which seems to ideally cover the suffering of a parent on ac-
count of her child's subjection to FGM. Even the Seventh Circuit
would have difficulty denying that a mother would suffer serious harm
if she witnessed the persecution of her child. But the mother's harm
itself must amount to persecution, and some courts may not consider
the mother's mental anguish a threat sufficient for asylum.
With two sensible statutory changes to derivative asylum and with-
holding of removal, almost all parents whose children face FGM in
164 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
165 See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
166 A father would presumably receive derivative asylum if his wife, the mother, were
granted humanitarian asylum, thus keeping the family together. See supra Part I.C.
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their home countries would qualify for relief. First, under current
law, only spouses and children of asylees generally qualify for deriva-
tive asylum. Thus, the spouse and children of an adult who receives
asylum for fear of FGM may remain in the United States, but the par-
ents of a minor child who similarly receives asylum for fear of FGM
have no option to remain with their child. The most obvious-and
reasonable-solution to this predicament is to change the statute.
The value placed on the family in American society, and specifically in
immigration law, supports the amendment of the derivative asylum
provision to include parents of minor children in order to keep the
families of persecuted children together.1 67 Why protect a child from
persecution in her home country and then subject her to another
form of suffering by separating her from her parents?
Furthermore, current immigration law lends support to this statu-
tory change, even beyond the primary policy of maintaining family
unity. In the specific instance of a person who receives asylum for
turning over a living American POW/MIA from the Korean, Vietnam,
or Persian Gulf Wars, the asylee's spouse and children, as well as the
asylee's parents, receive derivative asylum. 168 Amending the general
derivative asylum provision to match the POW/MIA asylum provision
would provide reliable relief for parents of alien children who face
FGM. As Judge Ferguson pointed out, surely Congress did not intend
to force parents to choose between deserting their children or expos-
ing them to horrific threats.' 69 We now know that many children are
the direct targets of persecution, such as when they face FGM in their
home countries. Immigration law serves to protect these children
from threats of persecution, but they deserve the further protection of
allowing their parents to remain in the United States with them.
The primary argument against amending the derivative asylum
provision is that it would increase the number of immigrants admitted
into the country, an unpopular prospect with many Americans.1 70
This concern, however, is misplaced. The President sets a ceiling on
167 The law provides that the spouse and children of an asylee may receive the same
status as the asylee. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text. Thus, if the statute
were changed to include parents of minor children, the parents could receive asylum
themselves. The child's siblings could then append their asylum claims to the parents'
derivative claims, allowing the child-asylee's entire immediate family to remain in the
United States.
168 See Persian Gulf War POW/MIA Accountability Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-258,
116 Stat. 1738 (amending Bring Them Home Alive Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-484, 114
Stat. 2195).
169 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
170 As this Note went to press, thousands of demonstrators across the United States
were protesting tougher immigration laws contemplated by Congress. See, e.g., Immigrant
Protests Hit New York, CNN.coM, Apr. 1, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/04/O1/im-
migration.rallies.ap/index.html; Elliot Spagat, Students Stage New Immigration Protests,
CHRON.COM, Mar. 31, 2006, http://chron.com/disp/story.mp/ap/naion/3763124.html.
[Vol. 91:899
A PARENT'S PREDICAMENT
the total number of refugees admitted each year,1 71 and granting de-
rivative asylum to parents of minor asylees would in no way affect the
President's control of refugee admissions. Although the absolute
number of refugees might rise slightly, the ceiling is rarely if ever
met,172 and it can always be reduced. Therefore, rather than taking
the unpopular measure of increasing the immigrant population, Con-
gress would be justly protecting innocent children. With this statutory
change, children would no longer be effectively orphaned by Ameri-
can courts purporting to protect them from foreign dangers.
A second feasible statutory change that would keep parents and
children together while avoiding FGM is the elimination of the excep-
tional hardship provision's ten-year residency requirement, which cur-
rently prevents most parents from receiving relief under the INA. 173
The residency requirement has little bearing on the hardship to the
child whose parent faces deportation. The parent may have arrived
only shortly before the child's birth, and the child may be less than
ten years old. Neither of these circumstantial details changes the fact
that an American citizen might be subjected to a form of torture or
ripped from the custody of her parents unless removal proceedings
are cancelled. Granted, the longer a child lives in the United States,
the greater the hardship in assimilating to the parent's native country,
but as Judge Posner observed in his Oforji concurrence: "The .. .ten-
year[ ] rule is irrational viewed as a device for identifying those cases
in which the hardship to an alien's children should weigh against forc-
ing her to leave the country." 174 The same reasoning holds true for all
Americans who would be adversely affected by the deportation of an
alien spouse, parent, or child. The residency period of the alien is not
necessarily related to the degree of hardship.
Despite the residency requirement's irrationality, however, Con-
gress is highly unlikely to repeal the provision, given the overwhelm-
ing political support for limited immigration. 175  Indeed, the
residency requirement was recently increased from seven to ten
171 See NANCY F. RYrINA, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., REFUGEE APPLICANTS AND ADMIS-
SIONS TO THE UNITED STATES: 2004, at 1 (2005), available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/
shared/statistics/publications/refugeeflowreport2004.pdf.
172 See id. (noting that only 52,835 refugees were admitted in 2004 even though the
President set the ceiling at 70,000); INT'L RESCUE COMM., THE U.S. REFUGEE ADMISSIONS
PROGRAM CRISIS CONTINUES IN 2003, http://www.theirc.org/what/theus_refugee_admis-
sions-program-crisis continues in-2003.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (tracking recent
years' actual refugee admittances).
173 See Oforji v. Ashcroft 354 F.3d 609, 620 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring).
174 Id.
175 See PollingReport.com, Immigration, http://pollingreport.com/immigration.htm
(last visited Mar. 28, 2006) (compiling polls by various agencies from 2005 and 2006).
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years.17 6 Although the rational solution is to remove the residency
requirement and focus instead on the severity of the hardship to the
citizen, it is difficult to imagine strengthening the hardship require-
ment enough to stem the tide of immigrants to the satisfaction of the
voting public. The provision already requires an "exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship" for withholding of removal, a robust state-
ment of the degree of the citizen's adversity. Yet the perception-if
not the reality-is that so many immigrants were being admitted
under the provision that the residency requirement had to be tight-
ened. Thus, in order to gain support for the elimination of the resi-
dency requirement, Congress would have to ensure that greater
numbers of aliens would not be admitted under the revised provision.
However, any additional restriction on relief, beyond the severity of
the hardship, would likely be as random as the residency requirement.
Even if the statute were amended to remove the residency re-
quirement, the definition of hardship would also need to evolve in the
context of parents whose children face FGM in a foreign country. To
maximize the benefit to these parents, courts would need to view the
separation from the departing parent as a hardship, even if the child
has the option of remaining in the United States with another parent
or guardian. At the very least, the court would have to inquire into
whether the child would in fact accompany the departing parent
rather than stay in the United States with the remaining parent or
guardian. Furthermore, courts would have to abandon the idea that a
parent who would choose to depart with her child and risk subjecting
the child to FGM in another country-rather than abandoning the
child in the United States-does not deserve custody of her child.177
The assumptions in considering hardship to a child should be that
"any separation of a child from its mother is a hardship" 178 and that
-a mother would not be expected to leave her child in the United
States in order to avoid persecution.'1 79 These principles should ex-
tend to fathers as well, thus placing the utmost value on keeping fami-
lies together. Only then will the exceptional hardship provision and
constructive deportation doctrine adequately assist parents and their
children who face FGM if the parents are deported.
Unfortunately, some courts currently consider separation of the
child from the parent a desirable alternative to withholding of re-
moval.18 0 But this position eschews one of the central values of immi-
176 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 308, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-615 (repealing 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994)).
177 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
178 Oforji, 354 F.3d at 617.
179 Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Dibba, No. A73
541 857, at 2 (B.I.A. Nov. 23, 2001)).
180 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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gration law: the integrity of the family. It also drastically increases the
hardship to the child, as separation from the parent is itself a hard-
ship. If the courts do not interpret the provision rationally, but in-
stead interpret it in such a way as to actually increase the hardship to
an American-citizen child, perhaps Congress should take a more dra-
matic step and define "exceptional hardship" more explicitly.
Ironically, if the derivative asylum provision is amended to en-
compass parents of minor children-and there are few reasons to sug-
gest that it should not be-but the current exceptional hardship
provision is retained, American-citizen children will be worse off than
alien children. If the derivative asylum provision is amended, parents
of minor asylees would automatically qualify for asylum.' 8 1 But with-
out an amendment to the exceptional hardship provision, parents of
citizen children would not qualify for withholding of removal unless
they met stringent-and irrelevant-residency requirement. Thus,
parents of American-citizen children would be less likely to remain in
the United States with their children than similarly situated parents of
minor asylees.182 Even as it is now, "although they are citizens, [Amer-
ican-citizen children] are treated as badly as aliens."183
CONCLUSION
Most parents with children who face FGM upon departure from
the United States are forced to choose between leaving their children
alone in the United States and risking their children's exposure to
FGM in their home country. Our law should never place a parent in
this predicament. Many parents have appealed to the courts for help,
seeking relief under five legal theories. Unfortunately, under current
law, only two groups of parents have a chance at relief: mothers who
have undergone FGM themselves and can convince a court to grant
discretionary humanitarian asylum, and parents of American-citizen
children who meet the stringent requirements of the exceptional
hardship provision, including the ten-year residency requirement.
However, with two statutory changes, almost all of these parents would
qualify for relief, and the children would not lose their parents or face
FGM. Immigration law cannot right the wrongs of the world,1 84 but it
can serve important social values by protecting the sanctity of the fam-
181 But see supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (noting that derivative asylum
applicants are subject to the same discretionary standards as the principal asylee).
182 Some would argue that such discrepancies reveal significant deficiencies in the cur-
rent citizenship regime. See, e.g., Oforji, 354 F.3d at 620-21 (Posner, J., concurring) (argu-
ing that Congress should rethink granting citizenship based on birth). That argument,
however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
183 Id. at 620.
184 See In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 350 (B.I.A. 1996) (Heilman, Board Member,
dissenting).
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ily, while ensuring that no parent is forced to choose between aban-
doning a child and exposing her to the physical and psychological
threat of FGM.
